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CObjective: Given the importance of health insurance for financing med-
icines and recent policy changes designed to reduce health-related out-
of-pocket expenditure (OOPE) in Mexico, our study examined and ana-
lyzed the effect of health insurance on the probability and amount of
OOPE for medicines and the proportion spent from household available
expenditure (AE) funds. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional anal-
ysis by using the Mexican National Household Survey of Income and Ex-
penditures for 2008. Households were grouped according to household
medical insurance type (Social Security, Seguro Popular, mixed, or no af-
filiation). OOPE for medicines and health costs, and the probability of oc-
currence, were estimated with linear regression models; subsequently,
the proportion of health expenditures fromAEwas calculated. The Heck-
man selection procedure was used to correct for self-selection of health
expenditure; a propensity score matching procedure and an alternative
procedure using instrumental variables were used to correct for hetero- O
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doi:10.1016/j.jval.2012.01.006eneity between households with and without Seguro Popular.
esults: OOPE inmedicines account for 66% of the total health expendi-
ures and 5% of the AE. Households with health insurance had a lower
robability of OOPE for medicines than their comparison groups. There
as heterogeneity in the health insurance effect on the proportion of
OPE formedicines out of theAE,with a reduction of 1.7% for households
ith Social Security, 1.4% formixed affiliation, but no difference between
eguro Popular and matched households without insurance.
onclusion: Medicines were the most prevalent component of health
xpenditures in Mexico. We recommend improving access to health ser-
ices and strengthening access to medicines to reduce high OOPE.
eywords: health insurance, medicines, Mexico, out-of-pocket expen-
iture, Seguro Popular.
opyright © 2012, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
utcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Medicines are essential for treating many diseases and for pre-
venting health complications, disability, andmortality. Many low-
and middle-income countries, however, struggle to achieve equi-
table, timely, and sustainable access to essential medicines. In
low- and middle-income countries, health-related out-of-pocket
expenditure (OOPE) formedicines represent between 26% and 63%
of total OOPE [1]. Although the variation in the values for OOPE
reported in the literature might be due to study design, the litera-
ture shows in general that medicines represent one of the most
significant components of health OOPE. In 2003, Brazilian house-
holds spent 41% of health expenditures on medicines [2]; in India,
75% of household health OOPE were spent on medicines [3]; in
angladesh, the figure was 70% [4]; in Burkina Faso, OOPE rose to
ore than 80% [5]; and in Vietnam, the total was 88% [6]. The
argest inequities were reported for income groups in which the
ost disadvantaged in terms of income spend proportionally
ore on medicines [1,7].
* Address correspondence to: Edson Servan-Mori, Center for Evalu
Universidad 655, Cuernavaca, CP 62100, Mexico.
E-mail: eservan@insp.mx.
1098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2012, Internation
Published by Elsevier Inc.In 2006, Mexico had the highest OOPE for pharmaceuticals
88%) among all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
elopment (OECD) countries [8]. What are the reasons for such a
igh percentage of out-of-pocket expenditure? Plausible causes
re 1) insufficient insurance coverage, whichmeans that a consider-
ble part of the population still lacks insurance; 2) insurance plans
hat only partly cover medicines; 3) insufficient availability of medi-
ines at the point of care due to unreliable supply systems; and
) personal preferences to use fee-for-service providers instead of
ervices provided by public health organizations or prepaid insur-
nce plans. Previous studies of health expenditures in Mexico have
ocused on catastrophic household expenditure on health and its
omponents [9–11]; all these studies concluded that medicines are
he first or secondmost important component, together with ambu-
atory care, of catastrophic health care expenditure. Knaul et al.
11] found that medicines are themost significant component of
ealth expenditure for low-income households, amounting to
pproximately 50% of catastrophic health expenditure for
ouseholds in the first quintile, whereas for the richest quintile
hey make up less than 20%.
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594 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3Policies to reduce out-of-pocket expenditure
The 2001-2006 and 2007-2012 Mexican governments have imple-
mented a series of policies that aim to reduce OOPE on health and
medicines in particular. The principal policy to address access to
health care and reduce household expenditure on health has been
the creation of Seguro Popular (SP), which provides a basic package
of around 250 health interventions including the provision of
about 300 medicines free of charge at the point of care [12,13].
Other relevant policy changes have aimed to improve the avail-
ability of medicines at Ministry of Health facilities. For many
decades these facilities have suffered from frequent medicines
stock-outs because of a mix of underfunding, logistical failures,
and lack of skilled personnel [14,15]. A presidential initiative
was launched in 2003 to improve the logistics in distribution
systems in each of the 31 federal states and the capital district
[16]. In 2007, the newly incoming government signed agree-
ments with the pharmaceutical industry and the Social Security
institutions to ensure fair public procurement prices and func-
tioning distribution systems [17]. The government organized
several high-level meetings among all public health sector pro-
viders to kick-start an initiative to provide a comprehensive
package of interventions to improve the availability of medi-
cines in public institutions, including the establishment of an
emergency plan in case of shortages of medicines, exchange of
experiences with other institutions within and outside Mexico,
and regular evaluations [17,18].
Given the importance of health insurance for financing medi-
ines and the recent policy changes to promote the reduction of
OPE, the aim of our study was to analyze the causal effect of
ealth insurance on the probability of incurring OOPE for medi-
ines and the proportion of household available expenditure (AE)
equired.
Health insurance in Mexico
TheMexican health system is divided according to employment in
the formal sector and informal or agricultural sectors [19]. Formal
sector employees are enrolled (by mandate) in Social Security; the
most important is the Mexican Institute of Social Security (Insti-
tuto Mexicano del Seguro Social), which provides services to pri-
vate sector workers. In 2010, the Mexican Institute of Social Secu-
rity enrollments represented 48.8% of the total population of 112
million. This was followed by the Social Security Institute for Gov-
ernment Employees, which provides health services to federal
government and state employees, covering 10% of the population
[20]. Social insurance (including the Mexican Institute of Social
Security and Social Security Institute for Government Employees)
provides a broad package of prepaid interventions, services, and
medicines included in the institutional formulary; medicines pre-
scribed by physicians working for the Social Security are dis-
pensed at the point of care free of charge to the user. The System
of Social Protection System in Health, or SP, a voluntary system of
public insurance for the poor without access to Social Security,
was implemented in 2004; in 2010, just over 43million peoplewere
enrolled, 92% ofwhomwere located in the first two income deciles
[21]. Finally, in 2010, only 3% of the population had prepaid private
health insurance;most of thosewere already covered by one of the
Social Security plans. People older than 65 years do not automat-
ically become covered by Social Security. Enrollment into Social
Security depends on the employment (or former employment in
case of pensioners).
Although in 2011 virtually all of the Mexican population was
covered by some type of public insurance, it is relevant to note that
the package of services and medicines provided as well as the
quality varies significantly among different insurance types. An
important issue is the availability of medicines included in the
formularies of each insurance type and which should be providedwithout charge: between 78% and 89% of Social Security users
receive their prescriptions free of charge, whereas in SP only 60%
of users receive free prescriptions [22].
Methods
Data and sampling
By using the National Household Survey of Income and Expendi-
tures (NHIES) 2008, we conducted a cross-sectional observational
and causal analysis. The NHIES is the largest survey on income
and expenditure in Mexico and represents the national level as
well as rural and urban strata [23]. It includes detailed information
on all types of income and expenditures for households in addi-
tion to individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics
for all household members. For the present study, the household
was the unit of observation. In total, the database included 29,468
observations, out ofwhich 28,260were eligible for analysis (house-
holds withmissing, incorrect, or incomplete informationwere not
included).
Out of 28,260 households included in our analysis, 23.6% of
households reported having no health insurance, 31.1% of house-
holds had Social Security, 34.0% had mixed affiliations, and 11.3%
had SP (Table 1). Although there were only small differences with
regard tomean age andproportion of females versusmales among
households according to insurance status, there were marked dif-
ferences in socioeconomic characteristics and local development
conditions: 71% of the heads of households with Social Security
had a secondary or higher level education, only 4% reported no
schooling, and 5% spoke an indigenous language. In contrast, only
32% of the heads of households with SP reported a secondary or
higher level education, 15% received no schooling, and 18% spoke
an indigenous language. Households with Social Security were
characterized by the highest percentage ofmembers older than 60
years (18%), while those with SP had the highest percentage of
children younger than 5 years (12%). Although only around 18% of
households with Social Security belonged to the socioeconomic
status 1 and 2, 74% of households with SP belonged to these socio-
economic status groups. Around 31% of SP households were also
beneficiaries of Progresa/Oportunidades and 68% were living in
rural and 34% in highly deprived areas (vs. 17% and 4%with Social
Security, respectively).
Exposure variables
Households were stratified according to the four types of mem-
bers’ medical insurance: 1) Social Security, 2) SP, 3) mixed affilia-
tion (householdmembers have either different insurance types or
only some members of the household were insured), and 4) no
insurance affiliation.
Outcome variables
We identified three outcome variables: the probability of OOPE
for medicines, total OOPE on medicines, and the proportion of
total medicines OOPE out of AE. All expenditures in Mexican
pesos were converted into US dollars as of 2008 (exchange rate
11.8 Mexican pesos  1 USD) [24]. The total OOPE on medicines
was calculated by taking the sum of all expenditures reported
by households in the last 3 months of 2008 for the purchase of
medicines, regardless of whether obtained with a medical pre-
scription; this was multiplied by 4 to obtain the annual OOPE on
medicines (data in the survey are reported as quarterly expen-
diture).
The AE was calculated by using the methodology suggested by
Xu et al. [25]: taking the average value of household food expendi-
tures adjusted for household size for the range of 45% to 55%. The
Table 1 – Main characteristics of the sample.
All
(N  28,260, 100%)
Social security
(N  8779, 31.07%)
Mixture
(N  9615, 34.02%)
Without coverage
(N  6682, 23.64%)
Seguro popular
(N  3184, 11.26%)
Without Seguro popular
(N  6529, 23.10%)
Head of household
Sex
Men 75.03 76.15 72.74 75.41 77.73 75.43
Women 24.97 23.85 27.26 24.59 22.27 24.57
Age (in yrs.) 48.28 (15.46) 47.69 (15.87) 51.14 (14.49) 46.48 (15.50) 45.44 (15.61) 46.42 (15.52)
Schooling
None 9.89 3.88 11.25 13.44 14.95 13.65
Primary 39.78 25.47 44.65 44.87 53.27 45.81
Secondary 31.49 36.93 28.80 29.62 28.11 30.16
More than secondary 18.85 33.72 15.30 12.08 3.68 10.38
Indigenous
Yes 10.87 4.83 11.09 14.92 18.37 15.26
No 89.13 95.17 88.91 85.08 81.63 84.74
Demographic
Proportion of people aged younger
than 5 yrs.
0.088 (0.143) 0.078 (0.141) 0.084 (0.131) 0.089 (0.149) 0.116 (0.161) 0.091 (0.149)
Proportion of people aged older than
60 yrs.
0.148 (0.292) 0.186 (0.346) 0.119 (0.208) 0.139 (0.299) 0.151 (0.318) 0.139 (0.298)
Household
Beneficiary of Progresa/Oportunidades
Yes 10.27 1.780 11.96 8.74 30.68 8.945
No 89.73 98.22 88.04 91.26 69.32 91.06
Healthy index 0.766 (0.117) 0.778 (0.125) 0.767 (0.102) 0.760 (0.122) 0.744 (0.124) 0.758 (0.121)
SES index, quintile
1 19.85 4.740 17.50 30.38 43.84 31.09
2 20.15 12.80 20.89 23.87 30.40 24.32
3 20.11 20.77 21.92 18.93 16.08 19.05
4 20.03 28.17 20.78 14.71 7.35 14.49
5 19.86 33.52 18.90 12.11 2.32 11.04
Locality
Rural
Yes 34.50 17.26 32.79 42.10 68.22 43.05
No 65.50 82.74 67.21 57.90 31.78 56.95
Deprivation level
Low 74.52 90.47 76.18 66.96 44.41 66.26
Middle 10.26 5.56 9.49 11.49 21.58 11.69
High 15.22 3.98 14.33 21.55 34.01 22.06
Source. 2008 National Survey on Household Income and Expenditure.
Notes. Mean or percentages reported (standard deviation in parentheses). For Healthy index construction, each household member was asked about his or her perceived health status, which was
measured on a five-point Likert scale on which 0 indicated very poor and 5 indicated excellent health (the index had values of 0 to 1).
SES, socioeconomic status.
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596 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3AE was the difference between the total household and the sub-
sistence household expenditures.
Control variables
The following characteristics of household heads were includ-
ed: speaking an indigenous language, sex, age, and schooling
level (no schooling, primary, secondary, more than secondary
schooling). At the household level, the number of children (0–5
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A global household health index (each household member was
asked about his or her perceived health status measured on a
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multiplied by 5 (for the maximum value in the scale). The index
had values of 0.2 to 1 and was included as a continuous variable.
In addition, a proxy of socioeconomic level of each household
was calculated and divided in quintiles by creating an asset index
by using a principal component analysis with polychoric correla-
tion matrix [27,28].
Finally, at locality level, we included urban and rural/semirural
trata and economic development status; a social exclusion proxy
as based on whether the household was located in an area clas-
ified as low, medium, or high deprivation according to the Na-
ional Council of Population Deprivation Index. This index has
een extensively validated and takes into account three major
imensions of economic development: education, housing, and
ousehold income [29].
Econometric and empirical approach
The probability of OOPE was calculated by using a linear regression
model adjusted for head of household characteristics, socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of household, and local
Table 2 – Test of balancing property of the propensity scor
Sample Mea
Treated
Head of household
Men
Unmatched 0.779
Matched 0.777
Age (y)
Unmatched 45.16
Matched 45.44
Schooling level: Primary
Unmatched 0.532
Matched 0.533
Schooling level: Secondary
Unmatched 0.287
Matched 0.281
Schooling level: More than secondary
Unmatched 0.035
Matched 0.037
Indigenous
Unmatched 0.180
Matched 0.184
Demographic
Proportion of people aged younger than 5 y
Unmatched 0.121
Matched 0.116
Household
SES index
Unmatched 2.579
Matched 2.481
Healthy index
Unmatched 0.743
Matched 0.744
Locality
Rural
Unmatched 0.696
Matched 0.682
Deprivation level
Unmatched 1.918
Matched 1.896
Note. The matching process included dummy variables to the 32 Mex
SES, socioeconomic status.characteristics. For theestimatesof theannual expenditure inhealthand medicines, a quantile regression model [30] was conducted
where the expenditure at the 50th percentile was estimated.
Because catastrophic expenditure has been defined as 20% or
30% of AE [2], we explored the probability of spending more than
20% and 30% of the AE onmedicines in association with insurance
status.We included additional thresholds (1%, 2%, 5%, and 10%) to
analyze tendencies [2].
Toanalyze theeffect ofhouseholdmedical insuranceonOOPE for
medicines it was necessary to account for two potential biases: the
firstwas related to thedecision to spend fundsonmedicinesbecause
there may be particular household characteristics that increase the
probability of health expenditure. This bias applied to all households
irrespective of their insurance type. The second bias was linked to
the decision to “buy” insurance because it was hypothesized that
households thatwere regularly incurring or expecting health expen-
ditures in the near future would bemore likely to enroll than house-
holds without those characteristics. To address these biases, we de-
cided to analyze households with Social Security, mixed affiliation,
and without insurance separated from those households with SP
where enrollment is voluntary in contrast to mandatory enroll-
%reduction t test
ontrol %bias |bias| t P  t
0.754 6.000 2.810 0.005
0.781 0.800 86.60 0.330 0.744
46.49 8.500 4.030 0.000
45.26 1.100 86.80 0.450 0.656
0.449 16.70 7.890 0.000
0.533 0.200 99.00 0.070 0.947
0.296 2.100 1.000 0.318
0.274 1.500 31.30 0.590 0.555
0.121 32.40 14.10 0.000
0.037 0.000 99.90 0.020 0.986
0.149 8.400 4.010 0.000
0.188 1.000 87.80 0.390 0.698
0.090 19.700 9.440 0.000
0.117 0.900 95.70 0.330 0.744
1.127 44.00 20.26 0.000
2.612 4.000 91.00 1.580 0.114
0.760 13.50 6.400 0.000
0.743 0.900 93.10 0.360 0.719
0.421 57.60 26.84 0.000
0.677 1.200 97.90 0.480 0.630
1.546 43.70 20.82 0.000
1.904 0.900 98.00 0.340 0.735
states. The t test for these variables satisfies the balancing property.e.
n
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598 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3First, to address the selection bias of spending on medicines,
we applied (in householdswith Social Security,mixed affiliation) a
Heckman selection procedure [31,32]. The following log probabil-
ity function was used:
L, ,2, 
i1
N
1Diln1Zi′	 · · · 	 DilnZi′
	


YiXi′1	21⁄2	 ln
YiXi′

 ln (1)
his equation assumes joint normality and describes first, the re-
ationship between an outcome of interest Yi and a vector of cova-
iates Xi, and second, the selection equation, describing the rela-
tionship between a binary participation decision Di and another
ector of covariates Zi. Rho is the correlation coefficient of unob-
servable characteristics associated with the decision to incur
OOPE and the total amount of expenditure.
In this analysis the selection equation included social ormixed
health coverage, indigenous language of head of household, the
proportion of members being children (0–5 years old) and people
aged older than 60 years, household health index, socioeco-
nomic index, urban and rural strata, and the locality depriva-
tion index. The outcome equation includes fixed effects at the
state level. The effects of Social Security and mixed insurance
were also estimated considering the sample weights given by
the sample design [23]. In this case, the estimations suggest
similar results.
Regarding the bias of buying insurance, a propensity score
matching process [33] was conducted between SP-affiliated
households and those without health insurance. The propensity
score can be defined as the conditional probability of receiving a
treatment given pretreatment characteristics:
pXPrD 1  XED  X (2)
where D  {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to SP and X is the
multidimensional vector of pretreatment characteristics [33]. If
the exposure to treatment is randomwithin cells defined byX, it is
also randomwithin cells defined by the values of themonodimen-
sional variable p(X). The parameter that received the most atten-
tion in the evaluation literature is the “average treatment effect on
the treated.”. Given a population of units denoted by i, if the pro-
pensity score p(Xi) is known, the average effect of treatment on the
reated can be estimated as follows:
EY1iY0i  Di 1
E	EY1iY0i  Di 1, pXi

E	EY1i  Di 1, pXiEY0i  Di 0, pXi  Di 1

(3)
here the outer expectation is over the distribution of (p(Xi) |
i  1) and Y1i and Y0i are the potential outcomes in the two
counterfactual situations of (respectively) treatment and no
treatment.
The nearest neighbor (NN)matching is a frequently usedmatch-
ing estimator. For a treated individual the closest in terms of propen-
sity score in the comparison group is chosen. Alternative ways are
theNNmatching “with replacement”where an untreated individual
can be used more than once as a match and NNmatching “without
replacement”where an individual is consideredonly once. The latter
was chosen for the present study. To avoid matching by a neighbor
very far from the treated individual but with the closest propensity
score,we contrasted theNNmatchingwithout replacementwith the
so-called radius matching [34].
Both algorithms for the matching were done by characteristics
of head of household (sex, age, education level, and indigenousT P M P M M O O O S N A * † ‡
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599V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3language), the proportion of members being children (0–5 years
old), household health index, socioeconomic index, urban and ru-
ral strata, the locality deprivation index, and fixed effects at state
level. These variables were the most correlated to the probability
of SP affiliation. However, results from the twomatchingmethods
did not show any differences. Table 2 shows several measures of
the balancing of the variables before and after radius matching
[33]. All variables included in the matching process satisfy the
balancing property.
The results of the propensity score matching were contrasted
with estimates that included instrumental variables (IV).Wooldridge
[35] proposes a linear model:
y0	1x1	2x2	 · · ·	 KxK	u (4)
where E(u) 0 andCov(xj , u) 0 (j 1, 2, . . .,K 1), butwhere xKmight
becorrelatedwithu. Inotherwords, theexplanatoryvariablesx1, x2, . . .,
xK-1 are exogenous, but xK is potentially endogenous in Equation 4. To
setheIVapproachwithxKendogenous,weneedavectorofobservable
ariables, z1, not in Equation 4 that satisfies two conditions. First, z1
must be uncorrelatedwith u Covz1, u 0
The second requirement involves the correlated relationship
etween z1 and the endogenous variable xK. A precise statement
requires the linear projection of xK onto all the exogenous vari-
ables:
xK0	1x1	 · · ·	 K1xK1	1z1	 rK (5)
here, by definition of a linear projection error, ErK  0 and rK is
ncorrelated with x1, x2,...., xK1 and z1.
If xK is the only explanatory variable in Equation 4, then the
linear projection is xK  0 	 1z1 	 rK, where 1  Covz1, xK ⁄ Var
z1. From the structural equation (Equation 4) and the reduced
orm for xK, we obtain a reduced form for y by plugging Equation 5
into Equation 4 and rearranging:
y0	1x1	 · · ·	 k1xk1	1z1	 v (6)
here v  u 	 krk is the reduced form error, j  j 	 kj, and
1  k1 (in addition, v is uncorrelated with all explanatory vari-
bles in Equation 6), and so ordinary least squares consistently
stimates the reduced form parameters, the j and 1.
We used the proportion of people affiliated to SP statewide
rom2004 to 2008 per state as IV [36]. These variableswere used for
he following reasons: the high correlation coefficient, the avail-
Table 4 – Probability of out-of-pocket expenditure on medi
percentage of the available expenditure thresholds.
Threshold All Social security Mixtu
1% 0.632 (0.624–0.640) 0.549* (0.533–0.564) 0.606* (0.59
2% 0.448 (0.439–0.456) 0.349* (0.335–0.364) 0.427* (0.41
5% 0.230 (0.223–0.237) 0.155* (0.144–0.166) 0.213* (0.20
10% 0.114 (0.108–0.119) 0.069* (0.062–0.077) 0.099* (0.09
20% 0.047 (0.043–0.050) 0.029* (0.025–0.035) 0.036* (0.03
30% 0.025 (0.022–0.028) 0.017* (0.013–0.021) 0.019* (0.01
Source. 2008 National Survey on Household Income and Expenditure
Notes. Social Security andmixture affiliation coverage effects by thre
socioeconomic at household-level characteristics, and locality char
Confidence intervals at 95% in parentheses. Models estimated as line
* Significant at the 1% level.
† Significant at the 10% level.
‡ Significant at the 5% level.bility of information, and others who have suggested their use37,38]. In addition, the suggested instrument has been used suc-
essfully as shown through statistical tests [35,39]. All analyses
ere performed with statistical software Stata/SE 11.1 [40].
Results
Descriptive statistics
The overall estimated probability of OOPE for health was 54.2%;
the probability of incurring health-related OOPE was statistically
significantly less for households with Social Security versus non-
insured households and less for SP households than for those
matched households without insurance. Even though statistically
significant, however, the difference was not economically signifi-
cant (49.4% for SP households vs. 56.0% for households without
insurance). The median expenditure among those households
spending on health was US$126 per year. Households with Social
Security had a median health expenditure of US$147.8 and those
with SP US$85.6. The median medicines OOPE was US$60, which
for households with Social Security was US$64 versus US$49 for
households with SP. Health spending represented 9.1% of the AE
(6.7% for households with Social Security, 8.6% with mixed affili-
ation, and 11.7% with SP). Medicines OOPE represented 4.6% of AE
(3.4% of AE for households with Social Security in comparison to
6.2% for SP). Regarding the total health expenditure, medicines
OOPE accounted for the majority with nearly 66% overall, 65% in
households with Social Security, and 72% for those affiliated with
SP (see Table 3).
There was a difference in the probability of incurring OOPE on
medicines between types of insurance, as shown in Table 4. Al-
though there was a statistically significant difference in the per-
centage of OOPE on medicines out of the AE for each threshold
between households with Social Security and those without, this
was not the case for households with SP and those matched
households but without coverage. The probability of incurring
OOPE in medicines of more than 30% was 4% for households with
SP. The probability of household medicine expenditure greater
than 30% of household AE was 1.7% and 1.9% in households with
Social Security or a mixture of insurance, respectively, signifi-
cantly lower than the probability found in householdswithout any
type of coverage (3.6%).
Effect of health insurance on OOPE in medicines
There was variation in the probability in medicines OOPE and the
s being associated with health insurance status by
Without
coverage
Seguro popular Without Seguro
popular
20) 0.710 (0.702–0.732) 0.738† (0.714–0.759) 0.732 (0.709–0.754)
40) 0.528 (0.512–0.545) 0.582* (0.556–0.608) 0.520 (0.502–0.537)
24) 0.296 (0.282–0.311) 0.326‡ (0.301–0.351) 0.288 (0.273–0.304)
08) 0.152 (0.140–0.164) 0.183* (0.163–0.204) 0.147 (0.135–0.159)
41) 0.069 (0.060–0.077) 0.073 (0.059–0.086) 0.065 (0.057–0.074)
23) 0.036 (0.029–0.042) 0.039 (0.029–0.049) 0.034 (0.028–0.040)
s adjusted by characteristics of head of household, demographic and
istics. Thresholds expressed as dummy variables (yes  1/no  0).
gressions with robust standard errors.cine
re
3–0.6
3–0.4
1–0.2
1–0.1
0–0.0
5–0.0
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600 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3types (Table 5). Households with Social Security had 28.5% (P 
0.01) less probability of spending on medicines; annual spending
was reduced by $26.5 (P  0.01), which means a reduction of 1.4%
P 0.01) ofmedicines OOPE out of the AE in comparison to house-
olds without insurance. For households with mixed affiliation,
he probability of spending on medicines was reduced by 8% (P 
.01), an amount of US$13.5 (P  0.1), and a reduction of 1.2% (P 
.01) of such expenditure on AE. Finally, the results of the Heck-
an Selection Model after the propensity score matching process
Table 5 – Effect of the health insurance on out-of-pocket ex
PANEL A: Effect of the social security and m
Select equal probab
of OOPE  0
Unweighted effects
Social Security 0.285* [0.022]
Mixture 0.082* [0.020]
Sample size 25,076
Expanded effects
Social Security 0.260* [0.030]
Mixture 0.084* [0.029]
Sample size 23,085,049
LR test of independent equations (  0)
2
Probability  2
PANEL B: Effect of Seguro p
Probability
OOPE  0
ATT after PSM process
One-to-one nearest neighbors matching
without replacement
0.032‡ [0.01
Radius matching 0.029* [0.01
Sample size 9,713
Heckman selection model by full maximum
likelihood after PSM process
One-to-one nearest neighbors matching
without replacement
0.097* [0.03
Sample size 6,666
LR test of independent equations (  0)
2
Probability  2
Radius matching 0.096* [0.02
Sample size 9,713
LR test of independent equations (  0)
2
Probability  2
IV (2SLS) estimation
Coefficient 0.158* [0.05
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 301.0
2 (1) P value 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 81.92
Endogeneity test
2 (1) P value 0.028
Sample size 10,015
Source. 2008 National Survey on Household Income and Expenditure
ATT, average treatment effect; OOPE, out-of-pocket expenditure; PSM
variable; LR, Likelihood ratio; canon. corr. LM statistics, canonical co
* Significant at the 1% level.
† Significant at the 10% level.
‡ Significant at the 5% level.hows that being affiliatedwith SP reduced the probability by 9.7% cP  0.05) and the annual amount spent by US$24.51 (P  0.01) but
howed no significant effect on the percentage of medicines ex-
enditure on the AE in comparison to households without health
nsurance. The direction of the effect using IV was similar where
he effect of SP on the probability (reduction of 15.8%) and the
mount (US$30.6 reduction) was statistically significant but not
he effect on the OOPE out of AE.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that the effect of insurance status was
eterogeneous. Although the percentage of annual AE on medi-
diture on medicines.
re health insurance on OOPE on medicines
Heckman selection model
Outcome equal amount
(annual US$)
Proportion of the household
available expenditure
26.53* [8.021] 0.014* [0.002]
13.51† [7.273] 0.012* [0.002]
25,076 25,076
32.96* [10.45] 0.017* [0.004]
5.725 [9.585] 0.014* [0.003]
23,085,049 23,085,049
7.120 4.920
0.008 0.027
lar on OOPE on medicines
Amount
(annual US$)
Proportion of the household
available expenditure
15.15* [3.765] 0.002 [0.002]
12.47* [4.509] 0.001 [0.002]
9,713 9,713
24.51* [8.470] 0.002 [0.004]
6,666 6,666
6.320 2.990
0.012 0.084
21.00‡ [8.645] 0.001 [0.003]
9,713 9,713
7.910 6.350
0.005 0.012
30.61‡ [14.47] 0.001 [0.008]
301.0 301.0
0.000 0.000
81.92 81.92
0.672 0.383
10,015 10,015
ensity scorematching; 2SLS, two-stage least square; IV, instrumental
ions Lagrange multiplier. Standard errors in brackets.pen
ixtu
ility
opu
of
2]
3]
1]
8]
6]
.
, prop
rrelatines was very similar for households without and with mixed
601V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3affiliation, those households with Social Security had a reduced
percentage. There was an absence of an effect of SP on the per-
centage of annual AE spent on medicines for all deciles.
Discussion
The results of the present study are relevant in variousways: First,
it is one of the first analyses that focuses on medicines OOPE,
showing that medicines continue to be one of the principal com-
ponents of OOPE related to health in Mexico representing 66% of
health OOPE even after a series of policy reforms and therefore
have an important impact on household economic situations. The
proportion of health expenditure on medicines in our study is
similar to the findings of a study of eight other low- and lower
middle income countries [1]. For households with SP, health-re-
lated OOPE spent on medicines were 72%, very similar to India
with 75% [3]. The proportion reported in previous analysis of
NHIES in 2000 inMexico was 60% out of health expenditure for the
first quintile of the household income group [41].
Furthermore, the study sheds light on the differential effect of
health insurance on medicines OOPE: although for households
with Social Security the proportion of OOPE for medicines out of
AE was reduced compared with those households without insur-
ance, for those householdswith SP that hadmedicines OOPE, their
insurance did not make a sufficient reduction in medicines OOPE
to reduce the proportion of this expenditure on the AE.
It is worth pointing out that households with SP had a median
Fig. 2 – Effects of health insurance on the proportion of the a
of annual household expenditure. Source: 2008 National Su
Confidence intervals at 95%. Models estimated as linear regrAE of US$1955 compared with US$2252 for matched householdswithout insurance, indicating that the program is targeting
those households that are more vulnerable to incur cata-
strophic household expenditure, which is in line with the ob-
jectives of the program and has been reported by others [42]. At
the same time, the results also mean that the medicines OOPE
must decrease considerably more for SP households to show an
effect on the AE and, hence, the proportion of households in-
curring catastrophic household expenditure, a key objective of
the implementation of SP. Possible reasons for continuing OOPE
on medicines despite affiliation with SP are: First, the current
package of interventions includes 312 medicines [13]. There
have been reports that indicate that the medicines included in
the list of reimbursements should be revised to better match the
clinical needs of pharmacotherapy of the affiliated households
[43]. Second, continuing OOPE could be the result of the short-
age of medicines in public facilities [14], which has improved in
the last two decades but has not been eradicated despite recent
strategies to strengthen supply systems [22]. Third, those
households with SP with the opportunity to use health services
free of charge at the point of the care have incentives to use the
services (moral hazard); however, because medicines might not
be available or necessary but are not included in the insurance
packages, affiliated households are required to spend more on
medicines than before [44]. In fact, some of the recent evalua-
tions of SP highlighted problems related to increased demand
but insufficient supply of medicines at the point of care [22,43].
Finally, additional analyses suggest that despite being affiliated
ble household expenditure spent on medicines by decile
on Household Income and Expenditure. Whiskers:
ons with robust standard errors.vaila
rvey
essiwith SP, households still used a significant percentage of private
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602 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 5 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 5 9 3 – 6 0 3providers. The fact that insurance coverage alone does not pro-
vide a guarantee of a reduction in OOPE on health and medi-
cines has been highlighted by others [45,46].
The study has some limitations. Medicines expenditure is
largely influenced by health status but NHIES does not provide
information on diagnosis or any other clinical information for
household members. Instead the self-reported health status of
each member of the household was taken as a proxy variable for
the need of pharmacotherapy, which is justified in the absence of
controlledmeasures of health status. Other studies show that self-
reported health status is a valid predictor of health includingmor-
tality, and offer the advantage over clinical assessment in being
applicable in a household survey [47,48]. Another limitation of the
NHIES that is related to the one mentioned before is the fact that
the survey collects information about the type of medicines based
on reported symptoms (cold, cough, pain, etc.) without collecting
information about medical diagnosis or risk factors that would
allowmore precise information about the therapeutic group of the
medicines bought. The study was based on a household survey
that asked individual members about their spending, which is re-
lated to recall bias [49]. At the same time, the NHIES does not
permit analysis at individual level because expenditure is reported
at the household level. However, the survey is considered “gold
standard” when analyzing income and expenditure in Mexico be-
cause it is the most detailed national representative survey avail-
able. Because the survey was carried out in the last quarter of 2008
one would expect that the expenditure on medicines related to
some diseases such as respiratory infection is higher than in the
first two quarters of the year. Finally, one of the main concerns is
the existence of bias attributable to the process of deciding
whether or not to spend on health. One possibility to correct this is
using IV including the probability of spending on health, but this
would mean the existence of independence between the steps
that seek to correct both biases. We believe that an effective solu-
tion to this problem is possible through the estimation of models
in three stages simultaneously addressing both types of bias; how-
ever, this remains to be a challenge for future studies.
To analyze the medicines OOPE in Mexico in more detail is
warranted because the results reveal some relevant questions
for policy making. First, what is the impact of SP on medicines
OOPE? This study found no difference between households with
SP and without insurance with respect to the proportion of
medicines OOPE out of the AE. A longitudinal analysis of the
medicines OOPE over time or a controlled study with an in-
depth analysis of the kind of health expenditure, the therapeu-
tic indication of medicines, and an assessment of diagnosis and
therapy is warranted to analyze the impact of the reform on
medicines OOPE in detail. The Mexican NHIES does not provide
sufficient detail for this type of analysis. Second, are the short-
age of medicines in public facilities and the selection of medi-
cines reimbursed by SP the main causes for the fact that house-
holds with SP incur medicines expenditures and therefore
result in no difference in the proportion of medicines OOPE
between households with SP and those without when adjusting
for other factors? A study of the medicines indicated for treat-
ment and the diagnosed conditions resulting in OOPE is neces-
sary to answer this question. Third, what are the differences of
medicines OOPE between states? Other authors have reported
very large differences in public expenditure between states [43].
he survey on which the present study was based is represen-
ative only at the national level; however, it would be relevant to
btain representative data for the state level. The states have
elative autonomy to decide about the implementation of SP,
nd high variance in the performance indicators of SP between
tates has been reported [50].
The recent reforms inMexico highlight the importance of strat-
gies for strengthening the provision of medicines that accom-
[pany policy changes to increase insurance coverage. SP made
some impact but has not gone far enough, particularly in relation
to expenditure on medicines. Improving access to health services
should go hand in hand with improving access to other resources,
among them medicines, to ensure achieving one of the principal
objectives of the policy reforms in Mexico—the protection of
households against catastrophic health expenditure.
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